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NOTES
THE APPLICATION OF CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN U.S. COURTS:
CUSTOM, CONVENTION, OR PSEUDOLEGISLATION?
Michelle M Kundmueller*
I. INTRODUCTION

Prior even to the coining of the term "customary international law,"
it has been an integral part of the law of the United States. Prior to the acceptance of the term "customary international law," U.S. courts used the
term "law of nations." The following excerpt from The Paquete Habana, a
turn of the century Supreme Court Case, demonstrates the change in nomenclature, as well as the fact that, at least in matters concerning the law of the
sea, the Supreme Court has long considered itself bound to apply customary
international law.
This review of the precedents and authorities on the subject appears to us abundantly to demonstrate that at the present day, by
the general consent of the civilized nations of the world, and independently of any express treaty or other public act, it is an established rule of international law, founded on considerations of humanity to a poor and industrious order of men, and of the mutual
convenience of belligerent states, that coast fishing vessels, with
their implements and supplies, cargoes and crews, unarmed and
honestly pursuing their peaceful calling of catching and bringing in
fresh fish, are exempt from capture as prize of war ....

This rule

of international law is one which prize courts administering the law
of nations are bound to take judicial notice of, and to give effect to,
in the absence of any treaty or other public act of their own government in relation to the matter. 1

* University of Notre Dame, Candidate for J.D. and M.A. in Political Theory 2004; Flagler College, B.A.
2000.
1. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 708 (1900). For further documentation of the history of the role of
customary international law in the context of U.S. judicial decisions, see Jordan J. Paust, Customary International Law and Human Rights Treatiesare Law of the United States, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 301 (1999) [hereinafter Paust, Human Rights Treaties].
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This body of law, whether it be called "customary international law"
or the "law of nations," has never remained static, but recent years have seen
dramatic expansion in its importance and prevalence in domestic courts. As
noted by a recent journal article, "[w]ith the increasing modern development
of certain areas of international law, including international human rights
law, customary international law has come to cover many areas of the law
that it historically did not." 2 As the body of customary international law
grows, so does its importance in U.S. courts, due to two factors. First, all
U.S. statutes which provide for claims based on customary international law
necessarily expand with the growth of customary international law. Second,
the growth in substantive customary international law makes questions about
procedure increasingly pressing, as their resolution will affect a larger area
of the law. This process is further complicated, as the procedure of customary international law itself evolves, permitting the application of its rules in
new ways. As pointed out by a recent commentator, "modern human rights
law-and thus customary international law-seeks to govern not only the
relationships between States, but also the relationship between a State and its
3
citizens and relationships of citizens one to another.
It light of both customary international law's longstanding importance and its rapidly growing sphere of influence, this Note seeks to examine
the appropriateness of the sources of international law applied by U.S. federal courts. In particular, it will examine the potential of present practice to
inappropriately undermine domestic law, including congressional legislation,
by giving international resolutions and declarations the weight of de facto
legislation in the field of customary international law. Further, this Note
will examine the discrepancy between customary international law as defined by domestic courts and the law which is in fact applied.
Before reaching the central inquiry, some preliminary matters must
be explored. After briefly describing the theoretical definition of customary
international law, this Note will proceed to a discussion of the stakes in customary international law. While the precise status and definition of customary international law has not yet been decisively adjudicated or fixed upon
by theorists, at least in all its implications, a discussion of the possible applications and misapplications clarifies the importance of these questions.
The heart of this Note will focus on customary international law as
applied by U.S. federal courts. This topic will be examined in three stages.
First, the definition of customary international law, as given by the courts
2. Daniel H. Joyner, Note, A Normative Model for the Integration of Customary InternationalLaw into
United States Law, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 133, 134 (2001).
3. Id. at 134-35.
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themselves, will provide a basis for exploration of their decisions. Second,
this Note will explore the sources of customary international law used by
U.S. courts in their decisions. Finally, the appropriateness of these sources,
in light of the definition the courts espouse, will be evaluated.
II. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW DEFINED

If there is one consensus in the field of customary international law,
it is the theoretical definition of customary international law. Though the
content of customary law is the subject of heated debate and complex legal
battles, the theoretical definition, at least in its broadest terms, is generally
agreed upon: customary international law consists of (1) the general practice
of States, which is (2) generally accepted as law by States.' Determining
what this definition means in practice has proved problematic. Attempts to
define the two component parts of customary international law, general practice and general acceptance as law, have failed to overcome two pitfalls.
Some definitions, like the broad definition of customary international law
given above, fail to give any concrete parameters. On the other hand, definitions that do give concrete parameters or set up applicable tests rarely obtain
general approval. In the face of these obstacles, no definition of "general
practice" and "general acceptance as law" can simultaneously provide concrete and generally accepted parameters of customary international law: nevertheless, the theoretical consensus that exists, in addition to a brief overview of the most important debates about procedural requirements, should be
outlined.
A. General Practice

The question of just how widespread acceptance must be to meet the
standard of "general practice" has yet to be answered by a concrete test or
standard. Some claim that this aspect of customary international law "has
4. See, e.g., KAROL WOLFKE, CUSTOM PRESENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 53 (2d rev. ed. 1993) ("An
international custom comes into being when a certain practice becomes sufficiently ripe to justify at least a
presumption that it has been accepted by other interested states as an expression of law."); MICHAEL BYERS,
CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL

LAW 130 (1999) ("Most international lawyers agree that customary international law results from the coexistence of two elements: first, the presence of a consistent and general practice among States; and, secondly,
a consideration on the part of those States that their practice is in accordance with law."); JORDAN J. PAUST,
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1 (1996) ("[C]ustomary international law actually has two
primary components which must generally be conjoined: (1) patterns of practice or behavior, and (2) patterns
of legal expectation, 'acceptance' as law, or opinio juris."); Olufemi Elias, The Nature of the Subjective
Element in Customary InternationalLaw, 44 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 501 (1995) ("Doctrine generally holds that
customary international law results from (a) the uniform and consistent conduct of States, undertaken with (b)
the conscious conviction on the part of States that they are acting in conformity with law, or that they were
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not given rise to any serious difficulties of legal theory, however difficult it
may be in practice to ascertain or decide whether there exists a general practice of States, and if so, what is its precise content." 5 While commentators
usually use many words in their attempts to make the term "general practice"
more concrete and therefore applicable to the concrete problems of customary international law, these attempts frequently produce definitions which
are longer but no more explicit than the term they set out to define. In International Law as Law of United States, Jordan J. Paust provides one such
explanation of the first component of customary international law:
It is also significant that the behavioral element of custom (i.e.,
general practice) is similarly free from the need for total conformity, and it rests not merely upon the practice of States as such but
ultimately upon the practice of all participants in the international
legal process. Thus, a particular nation-state might disagree
whether a particular norm is customary and might even violate
such a norm, but it would still be bound if the norm is supported by
patterns of generally shared legal expectation and conforming behavior extant in the community. If the patterns of violation become
too widespread,6 however, one of the primary bases of customary
law can be lost.
In other words, general practice must be general, but it need not be
universal. If practice is not general enough, then it no longer meets the test
for the first component of customary international law. This explanation
provides no further information about what the first component of the standard for customary international law is than the phrase "general practice"
and it simultaneously suffers from less than universal acceptance.
An opposing view is held by Karol Wolfke, who claims that the
"number of states involved in the custom-forming process" is not material.7
In Custom in Present International Law, she claims that the "conduct of
even one state, tacitly accepted as a legal right or duty by another, can lead
to the formation of a custom, that is, to the arising of a local customary rule
binding those two states." 8 In attempting to clarify the issue of how long a
practice must be carried on and by how many States for it reach the level of

required so to act by law.").
5. H.W.A. THIRLWAY, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW AND CODIFICATION: AN EXAMINATION OF
THE CONTINUING ROLE OF CUSTOM IN THE PRESENT PERIOD OF CODIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 47

(1972).
6. PAUST, supra note 4, at 3.
7. WOLFKE, supra note 4, at 59.

8. Id.
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"general," Wolfke demonstrates that, while she disagrees with Paust, she is
no more capable than he is of coming to a clear definition:
The requirement of a practice being uninterrupted, consistent and
continuous also no longer holds good. Everything depends on concrete circumstances. Certainly, interruptions of practice and inconsistencies in such practice often prevent the formation of a custom.
This does not mean, however, that every inconsistency or break
should lead to such a consequence. On the contrary, a return to the
same practice following interruption may sometimes constitute
evidence of the force of uniformity in the conduct of states, by no
means preventing the development of a custom. 9
Wolfke maintains that one event may be enough to establish customary international law; on the other hand, one event may sometimes not be
enough to show its destruction. In her understanding of customary international law, she admits the breakdown between theory and practical application. Because it all depends on "concrete circumstances," only the broadest
of generalizations-the least helpful towards developing applicable standards-fully describes the meaning of the "general" in the general practice
component of customary international law.
The term "practice" has given rise to a debate over what constitutes
State practice. This debate has resulted in several concrete suggestions but
failed to settle on a general consensus. In Custom, Power, and the Power of
Rules, Michael Byers discusses the current debate over what may and may
not constitute State practice. Byers describes the "polarisation between those
writers who think that only acts constitute State practice and those who support a broader conception . . . ."" This polarization can be observed in the
debate over whether or not the resolutions and declarations of international
organizations contribute to the process of creating customary international
law.11 In the words of Byers, "many non-industrial States and a significant
number of writers have asserted that resolutions and declarations are important forms of State practice which are potentially creative, or at least indicative, of rules of customary international law., 12 On the other hand, opposition to this proposition has been voiced by "many powerful States and some
writers."13
One issue that does seem to have been resolved is the question the
legal implications of State action which does not comply with that State's
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id. at 60-61.
BYERS, supranote 4, at 135.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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statements. Byers points out that some of the basic tenets of customary international law, such as the prohibition against torture, are widely disre4
garded by many States that voice support for the prohibition against torture.1
On this issue, however, Byers believes that "there would appear to be a
shared understanding among States that such actions which States deny or
attempt to conceal do not constitute State practice capable of contributing to
'5
the development, maintenance or change of customary rules.'
B.

GeneralAcceptance as Law

The second component of customary international law, general acceptance as law, is often referred to as opinio juris. Thirlway, author of InternationalCustomary Law and Codification, refers to this as "the psychological element in the formation of custom.' 6 Thirlway also explains the
problematic nature of opinio juris and the necessity of a better understanding:
[O]pinio juris. . has probably caused more academic controversy
than all the actual contested claims made by States on the basis of
alleged custom, put together. A present-day writer may be understandably reluctant to call upon his readers to devote further time
to this juridical squaring of the circle, but it is impossible to discuss the future of customary law without some study
of the ele7
ments which are regarded as going into its making.'
This problematic aspect of customary international law is a necessary
component of the definition, because, as Byers points out, "something in
addition to State practice should be necessary . . . for it is essential that one
be able to distinguish between legally binding rules and patterns of behavior
which are not legally required."' 8 The most fundamental problem with
opinio juris stems from the fact that "it involves the apparent chronological
paradox that States creating new customary rules must believe that those
rules already exist, and that their practice, therefore, is in accordance with
law.""9 Various theories have been suggested as solutions to this inquiry,
but, as of yet, none of them seem to have gained consensus support.
For the purposes of this Note, theoretical quandaries aside, the problems of the second component of customary international law closely resem14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id.
Id. at 149.
THIRLWAY, supra note 5, at 47.
Id.
BYERS, supranote 4, at 130.
Id.at 130-31.
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ble that of the first component: they are practical problems. What degree of
acceptance is necessary to meet the standard of "general?" What acts on the
part of States or their agents constitute acceptance? The level of acceptance
which meets the standard of general is no better defined in the context of the
second component than the first. What criteria can the international community use to distinguish between State action motivated by fear, the interests
of the State, or belief that the State action is required by customary international law? The definition of "acceptance" within the international legal
community is not any clearer than that of "practice" or "general."
This attempt to better understand the basic definition of customary
international law, like all such attempts which produce a non-controversial
definition, produces very little more than a simple reiteration of the definition. Customary international law is (1) general practice of States which is
(2) generally accepted by States as law. Deeper analysis of this definition
finds a world divided, in both theory and in practice.
III. USES, ABUSES, AND IMPLICATIONS OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN DOMESTIC LAW

Debates over the role of customary international law in domestic
courts continue to produce differing opinions about the role of customary
international law within the U.S. legal structure. While there is general
agreement that customary international law plays some role, the extent of
this role remains unclear. Three of the most important of the unanswered
questions are covered in this section of this Note: (1) whether customary
international law has the potential to trump federal legislation, (2) whether
customary international law is federal law without empowering legislation
from Congress, and (3) which political branch holds ultimate control over
the interpretation of customary international law. The resolution of these
issues will determine the power of customary international law in U.S. legal
systems. In doing this, it may also change the balance of power between the
respective federal branches by expanding the judiciary's ability to overrule
federal law. In the final analysis, the answers to the preceding questions will
determine whether customary international law or Congress controls in domestic legislation. The following section examines some currently viable
theories about the power of customary international law in the U.S. legal
system.
A. Dominance of Customary InternationalLaw over FederalLaw
Jordan J. Paust, who has authored a book and several law review articles on the subject of customary international law, asserts that the incorpo-
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ration of this body of law into domestic law is required by the Constitution.
He claims that "customary international law has been directly incorporable,
at least for civil sanction and jurisdictional purposes, without the need for
some other statutory base., 20 According to Paust, "[t]he Founders clearly
expected that the customary law of nations was binding, was supreme law,
created (among others) private rights and duties, and would be applicable in
United States federal courts.'
Based on his claims of constitutionally mandated incorporation of
customary international law, Paust delineates the areas of domestic law that
this affects. In some applications, customary international law enhances the
power of the "Executive under Article II, section 3 to 'take care that the
Laws be faithfully executed."' 2 2 In other applications, customary international law restricts the Executive: "Supreme Court and other opinions have
also recognized that while exercising Presidential war powers, the Executive
is bound by customary international law., 23 In addition to affecting the
President and therefore indirectly the Legislative branch, Paust claims that
customary international law directly shapes Congressional power because it
"can limit the exercise of an otherwise appropriate Congressional power and
thus can function partly as an aid for interpreting the extent of constitutional
grants of power., 24 The power of customary international law also affects
the courts, where it "may be relevant to an adequate interpretation of various
sorts of Congressional power in order to functionally enhance such powers." 25 Finally, Paust claims that the "latter process of incorporation might
include an enhancement of the power of Congress under Article I, section 3,
clause 18 to enact legislation 'necessary and proper for carrying into Execution ... all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of
26
the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."'
Because customary international law thus pervades the federal government, alternately limiting and expanding the powers of the respective
branches, it becomes a defining body of law in relationship to the federal
government. Hence, Paust writes, "in the case of an unavoidable clash between fundamental human rights supported by customary international law
and a federal statute, the human rights (which have a constitutional status)

20. Paust, Human Rights Treaties, supra note2, at 305.
21. Id. at301.
22. Jordan J. Paust, Customary InternationalLaw: Its Nature, Sources and Status as Law of the United
States, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 59, 81 (1990).
23. Id.at 81-82.
24. Id.at 83.
25. Id. at 83-84.
26. Id.at 84.
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must prevail."27 In normal conflicts between codified (treaty) international
law and federal statute, the last-in-time rule applies; this rule dictates that
whichever law was most recently enacted controls.28 Paust claims that this
rule dictates that, in conflicts between customary international law and federal statutes, customary international law always controls. 29 As Paust theorizes, "customary international law would necessarily be 'last in time,' since
custom is either constantly re-enacted through a process of recognition and
behavior involving patterns of expectation and practice or it loses its validity
and force as law., 3 ' By this reasoning, custom is always a controlling authority in the face of a directly conflicting federal statute.
The extent to which Paust claims that customary international law influences and controls domestic law leads to the question of who, within the
U.S. legal system, decides upon the content, interpretation, and manner of
application of international law. While all three branches of the federal government will have some indirect control in forming customary international
law, it also limits the scope of each. Hence, whichever branch is empowered
to control the application and interpretation of this body of law within the
domestic legal structure will be that much stronger, relative to the coordinating branches. In Paust's view, the judicial branch is responsible to "identify,
clarify, and apply" this body of law.3 ' In response to concerns that this role
improperly changes the balance of powers, he asserts that "it is precisely
because the federal judiciary has both the power and responsibility to identify and apply customary international law in cases otherwise properly before
the courts that there is no violation of the separation of powers when federal
32
courts apply international law while interpreting federal statutes.
In an article on human rights law and domestic courts, Richard B.
Lillich explores the role and the ramifications of customary international law
in United States law. Like Paust, Lillich bases his understanding of the role
of customary international law on the finding that "customary international
law, while not mentioned in the Constitution, is part of the law of the land to
be determined and applied by the courts whenever appropriate in making a
decision., 33 Based on this, Lillich states that "[t]he starting point in ascertaining what international human rights norms have been received into customary international law-and therefore are rules of decisions for domestic
27.
28.
29.
30.

PAUST, supra note 4, at 95.
Id. at 89.
Id.
Id.

31. Id.
32. Paust, Human Rights Treaties, supranote 2, at 331.
33. Richard B. Lillich, Invoking InternationalHuman Rights Law in Domestic Courts, 54 U. CIN. L. REV.
367, 393 (1985).
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courts-commonly is thought to be the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights .... ,34

The status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a

source of the customary international law rests solely on its position as evidence of existing customary international law. Lillich admits that, while the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights resolution was adopted without a
dissenting vote by the U.N. in 1948, it is not legally binding as a treaty, as it
has never been ratified.35
Thus, to the extent Lillich is correct that the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights reflects-at least in part-customary international law, and to
the extent that both Paust and Lillich are correct that customary international
law is part of United States law which should be enforced and interpreted by
'
the courts, it should also "be directly enforceable in domestic courts."36
Most customary international law claims in U.S. courts have been based on a
statute which provides for such a claim. The most common example of this
is the Alien Tort Statute, which dates back to the Judiciary Act of 1789 and
provides for federal jurisdiction over "any civil action by an alien for a tort
only, committed in violation of the law of nations of a treaty of the United
States. 37 The point of Lillich's suggestion is that, while there is nothing
wrong with providing statutorily for the incorporation of customary international law, as has been done in the past, it is unnecessary or redundant.
The implications of Lillich's claim that customary international law
may and ought to be directly incorporated into United States law even without statutory support are far reaching. He advocates that judges ought to use
human rights law-and implicitly all of customary international lawwithout statutory support. Not only could claims be brought in federal and
state courts without the benefit of enabling statutes, but, under the mirror
principle, the United States has an obligation, enforceable domestically, to
live up to the provisions of customary international law.38 Beyond this direct
effect, which has the potential to permit the voiding of a federal statute on
the grounds that it conflicts with customary international law (as defined and
recognized by the judiciary), Lillich predicts that customary international
law should have the "greatest impact on domestic law in the future by influencing the courts' approach to constitutional and statutory standards."3 9 This
means that the Constitution, federal law, and state law should be interpreted
in light of customary international law. As Lillich states, "litigants and
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 397.
Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73 (1789) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000)).
Lillich, supra note 33, at 397-99.
Id. at 411.
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judges already have invoked the [Universal] Declaration [of Human Rights]
for precisely this purpose., 40 Lillich hails this new world of customary
international law's direct and indirect incorporation into United States law as
offering "significant as well as virtually limitless possibilities for achieving
greater protection of the rights of individuals. 4 1
B. Dominance of FederalLaw over Customary InternationalLaw
The argument against direct incorporation of customary international
law focuses on several perceived evils, with the primary focus resting on
lack of constitutional justification and incompatibility with constitutional
principles such as separation of powers and democratic rule. In a Note that
focuses specifically on the question of whether customary international law
supersedes federal statutes, Garland A. Kelley takes a moderate position,
claiming that customary international law should not supercede federal law,
but that "American courts must attempt to reconcile U.S. federal statutory
law with conflicting international norms and standards, whenever possible.", 42 In the course of explaining why federal law ought not be superseded
by customary international law, based on constitutional interpretation, Kelley makes an argument for how customary international law has the potential
to threaten some of the most basic premises of American constitutional government.
Kelley challenges the claim that the last-in-time doctrine applies to
customary international law, pointing out that the Supremacy Clause leaves
ambiguous "how conflicts between separate classes of supreme laws are to
be resolved., 43 While conflicts between different types of federal law would
normally be resolved through the last-in-time doctrine, Kelley notes that
with customary international law this does not result in a comfortable outcome." The precise date of a doctrine of customary international law becoming effective, because of the nature of customary international law, is
impossible to determine; hence, any date chosen is entirely arbitrary. Unless
one is willing to accept the premise that customary law is constantly in the
process of being renewed-and, thus, that customary international law al-

40. Id.
41. Id. at 412.
42. Garland A. Kelley, Note, Does Customary InternationalLaw Supersede a FederalStatute, 37 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 507, 507-08 (1999).

43. Id. at 509.
44. Id.

JournalofLegislation

[Vol. 28:2

ways trumps legislative federal law-this issue presents a serious practical
obstacle to the application of the last-in-time rule.
In a discussion ofjus cogens, a specific form of customary international law, Kelley discusses two more fundamental problems of incorporation. Not only is the literature onjus cogens conflicting as to the substance
ofjus cogens, but the issue of who, in the arena of domestic law, will determine both the substance and applicability of jus cogens does not have an
obvious answer.45 The issue of where to lodge the power of applying customary international law creates a dilemma, but this is not the most daunting
problem. Kelley claims that "the most serious objection" is "that ceding
peremptory power to jus cogens norms is fundamentally at odds with basic
American constitutional values."4 6 Modern customary international law conflicts with domestic legal issues, issues concerning the self-governance of
Americans. Kelley explains that the heart of the problem lies in the potential
for customary international law, over which Americans have no direct control, to undermine democracy and the consent of the governed.
If our form of constitutional government stands for anything, it is the
belief that no law is law without the consent of the governed, as expressed
through our elected representatives. Preempting domestic statutory law with
norms of customary international law, particularly customary international
law based not on the practice of nations, but on declarations that are purposeful and hopeful, is to apply law that has been generated by non-United
States law-making procedure.47
Kelley contends that the loss of a truly consent-based government
would not be the only casualty of customary international law's dominance
over federal legislation: such implementation would necessarily come at
"considerable cost, upsetting the safeguards inherent in at least three basic
U.S. constitutional values and assumptions ....",48 Because directly incorporating customary international law as dominant over federal law would
necessitate using the courts as the applying and interpreting body, such incorporation by definition gives previously unknown power to the courts.
This power, as Kelley points out, comes at a price. The judicial branch's
gain would come at the expense of the President, Congress, and state governments. According to Kelley, such costs are "excessive and illegitimate."49
In an article on the authoritative sources of customary international
law in the United States, Harold G. Maier argues that both the
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 517, 527.
Id. at 528.
Id. at 529.
Kelley, supra note 42, at 530.
Id.
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governmental structure of the United States and the functional nature of international law itself compel the conclusion that the authoritative source of public international law in the United States is
the will of the United States body politic as reflected
in federal law
50
...not the will of the world community of nations.
Maier bases much of his argument on the role of territorial sovereignty. Territorial sovereignty and nationhood both require "possession of the internal
authority to decide whether to violate international obligations."5 1 Not only
is the authority to choose whether to follow international norms vested in the
body politic of each nation, but, as a practical matter, this is the only method
through which international law can be translated to the domestic front. In
the words of Maier, "[i]t is this functional reality, as much as any language
of the courts or of the Constitution, that supports the proposition that United
States decision makers are not bound by the Constitution to apply rules of
customary international law in domestic fora."52
In practice, this theory demands "active affirmative participation" of
a nation's "authoritative decision-makers" for customary international law to
have "applicability within a nation's legal system."53 Maier explains what
this means within the framework of the U.S. legal system, stating that the
"principles of international law are accessible to the federal courts when they
decide cases by the common law method. 5 4 While available to courts,
"those principles are given domestic legal effect by the authority of the court
applying them in its traditional common law process, not by some metaphysical omnipresence of the international legal regime." 5 The courts exercise their discretion in applying and interpreting customary international law.
Customary international law is further checked and, ultimately in the
scheme of U.S. law, balanced by the legislative branch. As the will of the
people of the United States-as determined through our own law-making
process-dominates the common law findings of the judiciary, so the
legislative findings of Congress, when they contravene a court's holding
concerning customary international law, reverse the holding of the court
system. In the words of Maier, when there is "conflict between the will of
the people, reflected by the act of their government institutions, and the will
of the international community reflected in customary international law, the
municipal will must necessarily control .... 56 Maier believes that, within
50. Harold G. Maier, The Authoritative Sources of Customary InternationalLaw in the UnitedStates, 10
MICH. J. INT'L L. 450,455 (1989).

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 456.
Id. at 475.
Id. at 476.
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pal will must necessarily control ....
."" Maier believes that, within the U.S.
political and legal systems, customary international law can and rightfully
does have a guiding role to play; ultimately, however, the decision-making
authority is still retained by the people and government, none of whom are
"subject to the limitations created by an international legal regime."57
C. Summary of the Issues at Stake in the United States Incorporationof Customary InternationalLaw
This section of this Note, on the legal authority of customary international law vis-a-vis federal legislation, has not been included with the purpose of discovering which position is correct. Rather, the overview of this
debate holds a central place in this Note because it demonstrates some of the
issues at stake as U.S. courts begin to integrate customary international law
into what were previously thought of as purely or primarily domestic issues.
Admittedly, the number of cases using customary international law in this
manner is still few and primarily based on some enabling federal statute.
Nonetheless, these decisions take on a greater importance in light of the debate discussed above. Should theorists such as Paust and Lillich prevail,
these early cases, taking the first modern steps in the process of identifying
and applying customary international law would become crucial precedent in
a law-making process that Congress would be powerless to overturn. On the
other hand, the case law about to be analyzed will lie at the mercy of the will
of the people and their Congress, should the theories of Kelley and Garland
prove prophetic. It is still too early to know which faction will dominate,
but this analysis of their theories does survey the potential spectrum of outcomes and the legal and political issues yet to be determined.
IV. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AS APPLIED IN UNITED STATES
FEDERAL COURTS

The purpose of this section is to analyze the method current courts
use when defining, identifying, and applying customary international law.
This Note seeks to scrutinize the process, not the results, of courts applying
customary international law. To the extent that this Note considers legal
results, it is concerned with potential future results, should the current trend
in judicial reasoning continue and be carried into a broader context. For this
reason, the outcome and the facts of the cases discussed are of little significance to this analysis. Rather than survey a large body of case law, this sec56. Maier, supra note 50, at 460-61.
57. Id. at 460.

2002]

Customary InternationalLaw

tion will focus on a few recent cases in which federal courts have dealt with
claims based on customary international law. In each of these cases, Congressional legislation provides for a claim under the customary international
law, leaving the defining, identifying, and applying of specific doctrines to
the courts. The cases were selected with the purpose of using the recent
cases, covering differing substantive topics falling under customary international law. In Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., a worker forced to labor without
compensation in Nazi Germany brought suit against the company for which
she had worked.58 Kadic v. Karadzic involved the claims of victims of
atrocities committed in Bosnia against one of the Bosnian-Serb leaders responsible for their treatment. 59 In Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., an
Indonesian citizen brought suit against an American corporation for environmental damage. 6 0 Finally, in order to put these modern cases in the context of the historical meaning of customary international law, this Note will
compare these modern cases with The Paquete Habana.6'
A. Defining Customary InternationalLaw
In Iwanowa, the court defined customary international law as "such
widely held fundamental principles of civilized society that they constitute
binding norms on the community of nations." 6' This definition of customary
international law includes both the traditional components found in most
academic versions. "Widely held fundamental principles of civilized society" functions as a custom component, and "binding norms on the community of nations" constitutes the convention aspect. In Kadic, the court did
not stop to give a general definition of customary international law. Instead,
it turned directly to the question of finding the "norms of contemporary international law."' 63 The court in Beanal referred to customary international
law as the "law of nations," which it defined as "customary usage and clearly
articulated principles of the international community." ' Again, the two
component parts, this time called "customary usage" and "clearly articulated
principle," were present in the definition.
When deciding issues which require substantive consideration of
customary international law, the court in Kadic did not define customary
international law generally before moving forward to consider its substantive
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999).
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999).
The PaqueteHabana, 175 U.S. at 677.
Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 439.
Kadic, 70 F.3d at 238.
Beanal, 197 F.3d at 165.
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content in reference to the issue before it. However, in both Beanal and
Iwanowa, the courts paused to give a general definition before considering
the substantive content. In both these cases, the courts gave definitions functionally similar to that given by academics, containing both the fundamental
elements of customary international law-custom and convention.
B. Applying the Definition
After giving a brief definition of customary international law, the
court in Iwanowa proceeded to name several potential sources from which to
extract the current law. Among the sources given were the works of jurists,
general usage of nations, judicial decisions on the customary international
law, and non-legally binding treaties.65 In its consideration of whether
forced labor constitutes a violation of customary international law, the court
turned to several sources to support its conclusion that "[t]he use of unpaid,
forced labor during World War II violated clearly established norms of customary international law."66 The court first cited the Nuremberg Tribunals
and several jurists commenting thereon.67 Next, the court referred to various
legal precedents, both domestic and foreign, holding that forced labor is
against the law of nations.6 8 In the citing of these courts and the Nuremberg
Trials, the Iwanowa court did not refer to any findings of previous courts on
international practices or conventions concerning forced labor. Rather than
focus on the specific topic of the legal status of slavery, the citations referred
to its many horrors.
In Kadic, the court faced several questions of customary international law and referred to a variety of sources to find the substantive content
it sought. The first issue was whether norms of customary international law
are binding on private actors. In affirmatively responding to this question,
the court referred to law review articles, statements by the Executive branch,
and The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States.69 The court also cited some U.S. case law, with the purpose of showing that the available case law did not refer directly to the question at hand.70
The court next turned to the issue of whether genocide is against customary
international law, citing, first, two non-binding U.N. General Assembly resolutions and, second, a binding treaty ratified by the United States.7' While
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
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the Kadic court considered other issues of international law, in these instances the court's decision did not rely on custom as a source of law because either a legally binding treaty or U.S. law provided clearly for the
crimes in question.
In Beanal, the court considered whether environmental damage violates customary international law. The court cited one treatise and a nonbinding declaration, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,
72
in support of customary international law binding in environmental matters.
Ultimately, the court rejected this evidence, stating that the plaintiff "fails to
show that these treaties and agreements enjoy universal acceptance in the
international community., 73 The court refused to use U.S. domestic environmental legislation to help find "articulable or discernible standards and
regulations to identify practices that constitute international environmental
abuses or torts. 74
C. Comparingthe Definition to the Practice
In identifying principles of customary international law, U.S. courts
refer to a variety of sources. As the previous section demonstrated, courts
use law review articles, statements by the executive branch, non-binding
international declarations, legally-binding treaties, non-binding international
trials, legal treatises, non-binding U.N. Resolutions, the Restatements, and
previous domestic precedent as evidence of existing customary international
law. It is important to note that none of these sources, except previous domestic cases, has binding force as customary international law in a court's
process of finding and applying customary international law; these sources
serve as evidence, like clues, in the court's search.
The sources of customary international law used by U.S. courts,
while they are useful in determining the convention aspect, do not suffice to
accurately identify the practice element. U.N. Resolutions and non-binding
declarations both refer specifically to what nations agree practice should be,
not what it is. While law review articles, treatises, and the Restatements
may attempt to summarize the current state of the law, they typically focus
on law and convention, rather than the international events which constitute
international practice. Previous U.S. cases, of course, have some binding
power, but they are not cited for the purpose of demonstrating international
practice, nor would they be the best source for this information. As custom72. Beanal, 197 F.3d at 167.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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ary international law, according to both courts and academics, contains the
elements of custom and convention, courts should examine international
practice, rather than focusing all their attention on convention. Further, it is
important to remember that many of these sources, such as U.N. Resolutions
and the works of jurists, frequently represent what individuals and groups
desire, rather than what they believe exists. Courts must give due attention
to the issue of whether a specific source presents customary international law
in terms of what the author or expert believes exists versus believes should
exist.
Analysis of The Paquete Habana will illustrate how courts might
take a more balanced approach, identifying the custom as well as the
convention aspect of customary international law. In this case, which took
place more than a hundred years ago, the Supreme Court considered the
status of seized fishing boats under customary international law. Before
deciding that principles of customary international law dictated that the
proceeds from auctioning the ships must be returned to their fisherman
owners, the Court examined many sources. The Court commenced with an
exploration of "ancient usage among civilized nations, beginning centuries
ago." 75 Beginning with Henry IV of England in 1403, the Court cited
international practices, with a focus on the acts of Kings.76 Rather than
focusing on the legal conclusions of commentary, the Court referred to
historical incidents. In examining American history, the Court noted actual
practices of the American government rather than the opinions or statements
of policy." After examining American practice, the Court turned to a
detailed analysis of the legal literature and cases, domestic and foreign,
available on the law of the sea.78 Even here, however, there was a marked
deference to practice, as many of the works cited were written by men with
considerable maritime experience.7 9
The Supreme Court's analysis in The Paquete Habanademonstrates
how a court can explore an issue of customary international law while directing attention to both custom and convention. In today's cases, a less historically-focused approach than that taken in The Paquete Habana would be
preferable, as customary international law admittedly evolves at a faster pace
than it did in 1900. However, the fast pace of modern customary international law development does not excuse the utter disregard given to practice
by current U.S. courts. So long as custom remains an element of customary
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
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international law, courts must include analysis of international practice in
their decisions on customary international law.
V. CONCLUSION

This Note has attempted to demonstrate some of the difficulties of
applying customary international law in U.S. courts. At every level, there are
unanswered questions. Many of these issues, like how "general" a practice
or its acceptance must be in order to constitute customary international law,
can only be given imprecise answers. Not only are these general problems
inherent in all legal questions involving line-drawing in the defining of customary international law, but there is a virtual war being waged over where
that line should be drawn and by whom. This issue, in turn, raises questions
of constitutional importance, the gravity of which it is almost impossible to
overstate. Practical concerns about the balance of powers, no less than theoretical misgivings over undermining our government's consent-based authority and legitimacy, demand our attention as the possibility of directly incorporating customary international law, perhaps even when in direct
contravention of federal statute, comes closer to becoming a reality.
Current cases do not present any of these possibilities as realities.
They do, however, contain the beginnings of what could become fundamental structural changes in customary-and hence, United States-law should
the judicial system prove dominant in determining customary international
law. Current cases show U.S. courts, on a fairly modest level, defining, determining, and applying customary international law. The cases have yet to
produce a real showdown between domestic, either constitutional or congressional, and customary law. To date, congressional and executive actions
and statements have been taken as one type of evidence in determining the
content of customary international law, but they have not served as dispositive or controlling in the face of overwhelming evidence that customary international law as a whole dictates a contrary outcome.
This,. of course, is the real issue. What happens when the will of the
people or a dictate of the Constitution conflicts directly with customary international law? No doubt, our courts will do their best to interpret creatively so as to avoid such a conflict, but, eventually, the conflict will come,
and a decision will be made. The conflict is inevitable due to the nature of
modern customary international law. No longer delegated to issues traditionally understood as exterior, modern customary international law is beginning to define relationships between governments and their citizens and
amongst citizens.
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The conclusions of this Note are three. First, there is an impending
constitutional crisis, with the potential to alter the fundamental structure of
our laws and the legal authority (if not the power) of the American people.
Second, in this eminent struggle, Congress ought to take the lead, controlling
through legislation the authority of customary international law in domestic
matters and thus circumventing the potential conflict between international
and domestic law by upholding the supremacy of U.S. law in domestic matters. The courts will by necessity play a crucial role, for they must concur
that this role belongs to the legislature and that federal law is supreme.
Third, U.S. courts must, in their role as interpreters of customary international law, hold ever present in their determinations the recognized definition of customary law, which encompasses both a custom and a convention
element: the practice of nations ought not be ignored. By this means, they
will be surer of applying customary international law as it exists, rather than
as courts and commentators wish it to be.

